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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Crespo'
(decided September 22, 2010)
Detective Larry Maraj handcuffed defendant Jose Crespo
believing him to be in possession of drugs.2 Defendant Crespo
revealed nine Ziploc bags of crack cocaine from his rectal area after
Maraj told him that if he failed to cooperate, Maraj would charge him
with a separate felony for every bag he would personally uncover.3
The primary focus of this Article is the defendant's purported waiver
of his Fourth Amendment and New York State constitutional rights in
his act of "voluntarily" producing the drugs from his body.' The
defense argued that Crespo removed the drugs in response to a
coercive interrogation, and thus involuntarily waived' his rights
under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and article
I, section 12 of the New York Constitution.6 The court granted
defendant's motion to suppress the drugs, holding that the
People v. Crespo, No. 10-1812, slip op., at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
2 Id. at 2.
SId.
4 Id. at 6 (the court did not need to decide on the constitutionality of the search given that
the evidence was already held to be suppressed for being a Miranda violation. This however
does not make addressing the constitutional issues in every case superfluous, for there are
cases where consent to a search is given by a defendant prior to any need for a Miranda
warning, e.g., when a suspect is not yet under arrest or in police custody).
s See id at 3. "[Bly allowing the police to conduct a search, a person "waives" whatever
right he had to prevent the police from searching." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 235 (1973).
6 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article 1, section 12 of the New York Constitution states identical language to the
relevant United States Constitution amendment.
651
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defendant's production of the drugs from his private area was the
result of official coercion, and therefore not a voluntary waiver of his
Fourth Amendment rights.
On April 18, 2010, Detective Larry Maraj, an experienced
police officer with over 200 drug-related arrests and specialized
training in street narcotics enforcement, received a radio transmission
that informed him of a narcotics sale that was to take place and a
description of the suspects involved.8 Maraj observed two men
walking on the street corner of 129th Street and Madison Avenue,
who fit the descriptions he heard over the radio.' The two suspects
greeted each other by shaking hands and briefly spoke.'o Maraj then
observed one of the men, later learned to be Wallace McCollough,
give the defendant Crespo currency, followed by Crespo's placement
of a small unidentifiable object in McCollough's hand." Based upon
his experience, Maraj had a strong belief that a drug sale just took
place, and proceeded to arrest Crespo.12  The events that ensued,
following the handcuffing of Crespo, are the basis of the legal
dispute.
Once Crespo was handcuffed, he was officially considered to
be in police custody. 13 After Maraj handcuffed the defendant and
frisked him for weapons, he notified the defendant that he was being
arrested for a "narcotics sale," but failed to read Crespo his Miranda
rights.14 Crespo subsequently responded: " 'Search me, I don't have
anything,' " but Maraj did not conduct a search for drug
paraphernalia at this time, or at any point.' 5 Instead, Maraj, acting on
his police instincts honed after ten years of experience, told Crespo
7 Crespo, No. 10-1812 slip op., at 7.




12 Crespo, No. 10-1812 slip op., at 3-4 ("[P]robable cause exists when a police officer has
knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an
offense has been or is being committed." (citing People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 455
(N.Y. 1985))). It is odd that defense counsel did not argue a lack of probable cause for
making the arrest. According to the court's finding, any person who finds themselves in an
area notorious for drug dealing may be handcuffed and searched for the simple act of giving
a friend a small unidentifiable object in the street. Crespo, No. 10-1812 slip op., at 4.
14 Id at 2-3.
" Id at 2.
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he believed that Crespo had drugs concealed in his rectal area.16
Crespo again denied that he had any drugs in his possession." Maraj
told Crespo that if he did not cooperate and reveal the drugs, Maraj
would "look up there" himself.'8  Maraj also told Crespo that if he
failed to cooperate, he would charge the defendant with a separate
felony for every bag uncovered.19 Crespo then reached into his back
pants and revealed nine Ziploc bags of crack cocaine. 20
After the court found that suppression of the evidence was
required because of a Miranda violation and the consent being a
product of "traditional involuntariness" in violation of section
60.45(2)(a)(ii) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law,21 it found
that the defendant's production of the drugs was a consequence of
"official coercion, a yielding to overbearing official pressure, and not
a voluntary" relinquishment of his right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.22 Crespo did not explain why the defendant's own
production of drugs from his private area implicated the Fourth
Amendment, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
16 Id.
17 Crespo, No. 10-1812 slip op., at 2.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. See also id. at 10 (noting that the defendant, not the officer, removed the drugs,
therefore, "the exact location where the bag of drugs was concealed was never ascertained;
that is, whether it was within an area above the defendant's rectum, or whether it was
partially or fully within a body cavity").
21 Section 60.45(2)(a)(ii) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law states, in pertinent
part:
2. A confession, admission or other statement is "involuntarily made" by
a defendant when it is obtained from him: (a) By any person by the use
or threatened use of physical force upon the defendant or another person,
or by means of any other improper conduct or undue pressure which
impaired the defendant's physical or mental condition to the extent of
undermining his ability to make a choice whether or not to make a
statement ....
The Crespo opinion, written by Hon. Juan M. Merchan, discussed how the statement did not
amount to consent to a search. Crespo, No. 10-1812, slip op. at 6. However, if Crespo's
statement did constitute a valid consent, the conduct of the detective went beyond the scope
of the consent. Id. (stating that "even when a consent to search is obtained, the scope of such
consent must be strictly construed"). The court reasoned that the statement was merely a
consent to search of the defendant's "outer clothing, and not a consent to a strip search or a
body cavity search," mainly because the officer had not yet conducted a search incident to
arrest. Id. Judge Merchan held that the statement failed to meet the high standard necessary
to qualify as consent to a strip or body cavity search. Id. at 6, 8.
22 Id. at 7 (citing People v. Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 580 (N.Y. 1976)).
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seizures, where the officer did not conduct the search himself.23
Furthermore, the government was prohibited from using the
inevitable discovery doctrine, which sometimes allows the
introduction of evidence illegally obtained.24
The crux of the issue is whether the defendant's waiver of his
Federal and New York Constitutional rights in revealing the narcotics
from a private area of his body was a "free and unconstrained
choice." 25 The Crespo court correctly applied federal and New York
case law in finding that the defendant's waiver of his Fourth
Amendment and New York constitutional rights was a product of
official police coercion.26 The court was also right in taking into
account the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest in
coming to its conclusion that the waiver of the defendant's
constitutional rights was involuntary. 27 The court missed the mark in
holding that the defendant was never searched. 28 The court made an
unjustified expansion of the Fourth Amendment's reach by applying
it to searches conducted not by the officer who applied the coercion,
but by the individual who experienced the coercion.
The Supreme Court decision Schneckloth v. Bustamonte29 was
heavily relied upon by the Crespo court in coming to its holding. It is
well settled that a warrantless search is " 'per se unreasonable' "
absent " 'a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.' "3o One of the " 'well-delineated exceptions' " to a
23 This vital issue will be discussed later in the Article.
24 In the court's final analysis it discusses whether the inevitable discovery doctrine
applied to the evidence, precluding suppression: "The test for inevitable discovery is whether
it has been demonstrated, by a very high degree of probability, that the evidence sought to be
suppressed would inevitably have been discovered, irrespective of the initial wrong."
Crespo, No. 10-1812, slip op., at 7. The court found that the inevitable discovery doctrine
can only revive suppressed evidence if the evidence is secondary, meaning it was not
obtained as a direct consequence of the improper police conduct. Id. The evidence at issue
did not meet those criteria. Id. at 8. Further, the court found that even if the evidence could
be classified as secondary, it would not have inevitably been discovered because the officer,
in order to discover the drugs, would have had to conduct a strip search, which would not
have been proper because the officer did not have any factual basis to support his suspicion
that drugs were being concealed in the defendant's rectal area, which is required to warrant a
strip search. Id. at 8.
25 Id. at 6 (citing Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575).
26 Crespo, No. 10-1812, slip op., at 7.
27 id.
28 Id. at 10.
29 412 U.S. 218.
30 Id. at 219 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
654 [Vol. 27
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warrantless search is a search conducted pursuant to consent.3 1 In
Bustamonte, the Court defined the term "consent" in the context of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.3 2
In Bustamonte, the defendant loaned his vehicle to his brother
and five friends who were pulled over by the police for a burned-out
headlight. None of the occupants of the car were ever under arrest
or could be deemed to be in police custody at any point.34 After two
other officers arrived at the scene, one of the officers asked the
vehicle owner's brother if the officers could search the vehicle, to
which he responded: " 'Sure, go ahead.' "s The atmosphere of the
incident was characterized as " 'congenial,' " without any hint of a
threat of arrest;36 the vehicle owner's brother even aided in the search
by opening the trunk and the glove compartment.37 One of the
officers discovered three stolen checks hidden beneath the rear car
seat.3 ' The defendant was arrested and charged with possessing a
check with intent to defraud, in violation of California Penal Code
section 475(a).39  The defendant claimed that his brother did not
"consent" to the search because he was unaware at the time of his
right to refuse consent to a search. 40 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit agreed with this contention and held that the State had
the burden of proving that the person giving consent knew of his right
to refuse consent to a search in order to stay within the bounds of the
Constitution.4 1
The Supreme Court reversed, noting first in its discussion the
competing interests of promoting effective police investigations and
31 Id. at 219.
32 id
1 Id. at 220.
34 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 220.
3s Id. (noting that although the defendant wasn't present to offer his consent to a search,




3 CAL. PENAL CODE § 475(a) (Deering 2010).
40 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 221-22.
41 Id. at 223 (the California State courts follow the rule that this "knowing" factor is just
one of many that should be considered in looking at the totality of the circumstances in
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the right a citizen has in being free from unreasonable searches.42
The Court stated that police need to be given considerable leeway in
conducting searches, but on the opposite end of the spectrum "is the
set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal
law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness." 43 It was these
two counterbalancing principles that formed the basis of the Court's
holding." Recognizing the importance of permitting one to consent
to a search, the Court held that:
[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments45 require
that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit
means, by implied threat or covert force. For no
matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the
resulting "consent" would be no more than a pretext
for the unjustified police intrusion against which the
Fourth Amendment is directed.46
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's subjective test of
requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew he had a
right to refuse consent in order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.47
The Bustamante Court did not want to follow "any such litmus-paper
test of voluntariness" because it would enable a defendant to simply
deny having the requisite knowledge of his right to refuse consent,
thereby making inadmissible any evidence tainted by an otherwise
reasonable search.48
The Court differentiated between a waiver of certain rights
made during a criminal court proceeding, and a Fourth Amendment
waiver. It was noted, that in order for a defendant to validly "waive"
his constitutional rights in the context of the safeguards of a fair
criminal trial, a defendant must knowingly and intelligently
relinquish a known right or privilege. 49 However, the Court did not
42 Id. at 224-25.
43 Id. at 225.
4 See id. at 227.
4s The Court did not discuss the Fifth Amendment, presumably, because the defendant was
not present during the search, therefore it was his brother who incriminated the defendant
and not the defendant himself. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 221-22.
46 Id. at 228.
47 Id. at 229.
48 Id. at 230.
49 See id. at 235.
[Vol. 27656
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/9
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
find it necessary to follow this "knowing and intelligent" waiver test
in the context of the right to privacy, finding that it only applied in
cases concerning rights intended to ensure that a defendant receives a
fair trial such as the right to a speedy trial, the right to a jury trial, and
the right to confrontation.o It believed that the Fourth Amendment
stands to preserve "values reflecting the concern for our society for
the right of each individual to be let alone."' The Court seemed to
believe that these values are not as dangerously susceptible to
involuntary waiver as those "basic protections that the Framers
thought indispensable to a fair trial."52 The Bustamonte Court
reasoned that it is not a part of the policy of the Fourth Amendment
to discourage officers from obtaining a consent to search, because
such consent could aid in a police investigation by narrowing the
suspect list down, which benefits society as a whole. 53 Unlike Fourth
Amendment waivers, "every reasonable presumption ought to be
indulged against voluntary relinquishment" of constitutional rights
designed to further the fundamental principle of a fair trial. 54
The Court also drew this distinction between a coercion-
induced consent to search, and the coercion-induced consent to a
relinquishment of rights meant to promote a fair trial, for pragmatic
purposes: "It would be unrealistic to expect that in the informal,
unstructured context of a consent-based search, a policeman, upon
pain of tainting evidence obtained, could make the detailed type of
examination demanded" by the strict "voluntary and intelligent" test,
as is conducted during trial to determine if a defendant, who has
waived his right to counsel, has done so voluntarily. 5 It also pointed
out that the consequences can be far more severe for waiving one's
rights associated with a trial, such as the right to plead not guilty,
compared to waiving one's Fourth Amendment right to privacy. 56
Bustamonte made clear that its holding was limited to cases
where "the subject of a search is not in custody," and where the State
attempts to justify the search on the basis of the defendant's
50 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 237-38.
' Id. at 242.
52 id.
s3 See id. at 243.
54 See id.
1s Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 245.
s6 Id. at 246.
6572011]
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consent. The Court held that in such a case, the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments require the State to prove the consent was
voluntarily given and not a result of coercion or duress, either express
or implied.58  Voluntariness is a question of fact that must be
determined from a totality of the circumstances, with the defendant's
actual knowledge of his right to refuse consent being only one factor
that may be considered in establishing if consent was voluntarily
given.s9 Any relevant factors, the Court stated, could be considered
in determining whether consent was voluntarily given including, but
not limited to, "evidence of minimal schooling, low intelligence, and
the lack of any effective warnings to a person of his rights." 60
It is not clear whether the Court's decision would have varied
if the defendant, as in Crespo, was in police custody at the time that
the "consent" was given, and the search was of the person rather than
the person's vehicle. It is also unclear how Bustamonte applies to
cases in which the consenting party involuntarily reveals the
contraband, instead of the police finding the contraband during a
physical search, and whether the Court would hold that this
implicates the Fourth Amendment at all.
The Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. California61
sheds some light on the issue of Fourth Amendment violations in the
context of an involuntary search of a person's body.62 Although
Schmerber does not concern the issue of consent, it explains how the
Fourth Amendment applies in searches involving some form of
penetration of the person's body, which is what occurred in Crespo.
In Schmerber, the defendant was arrested for driving while
under the influence of alcohol. 63 The defendant drove into a tree and
suffered injuries that required medical attention.64 The arresting
officer read the defendant his Miranda warnings at the hospital and
informed him that a blood alcohol test would be administered to
determine his blood alcohol content.6' Taking the advice of counsel,
57 Id. at 248.
58 id
'9 Id at 227-31.
6o Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248.
6' 348 U.S. 757 (1966).
62 Id.
61 Id. at 758.
6 Id. at 759.
6s Id at 758-59.
[Vol. 27658
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the defendant refused to consent to the blood test, but a physician, at
the direction of the police officer, commenced the minimally invasive
test anyway.
The Schmerber Court held that the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated. The Court prefaced its
discussion of the Fourth Amendment issue by stating that the
"overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." 68
With this philosophy as a back drop, the Court concluded that the
forced administration of a blood test is undoubtedly a "search and
seizure" contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.69
The blood test was found to implicate the Fourth Amendment,
but this was not conclusive of the Court's inquiry because the Court
believed that the Fourth Amendment was not designed to protect
against all intrusions, but only those that are unjustified under the
circumstances, or employed in an improper manner. 70  The Court,
therefore, decided whether "the police were justified in requiring
petitioner to submit to a blood test, and whether the means and
procedures employed in taking his blood test respected relevant
Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness." 7'
The Schmerber Court held that the officer was justified in
demanding a blood test, and that the blood test was conducted in a
reasonable fashion.72 The Court mentioned the great importance of
having a detached and neutral judge or magistrate determine whether
an invasion of another person's body is warranted, rather than a
police officer who has the driving motive, not to promote justice and
fairness, but to put criminals behind bars. 73 The Court found that the
warrant requirement could only be obviated under circumstances
6 Schmerber, 348 U.S. at 759 (blood alcohol tests "are a commonplace in these days of
periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood
extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk,
trauma, or pain").
67 Id. at 772.
68 Id. at 767.
69 Id. (stating that "[s]uch testing procedures plainly constitute searches of "persons," and
depend antecedently upon seizures of "persons," within the meaning of [the] [Fourteenth]
Amendment").
70 See id at 768.
71 Schmerber, 348 U.S. at 768.
72 Idat771.
7 See id. at 770.
2011] 659
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where the officer "might reasonably have believed that he was
confronted with an emergency, in which delay necessary to obtain a
warrant ... threatened 'the destruction of evidence.' 74 In applying
this standard to the specific facts, the Court found that such an
"emergency" existed because of the scientific fact that blood alcohol
content diminishes with time;75 the amount of time wasted in
obtaining a warrant would have allowed the alcohol to dissipate from
the defendant's blood stream, therefore resulting in a " 'destruction of
evidence.' "76 On this basis alone, the Court found that the officer
was justified in demanding a blood test. n
The decision in Schmerber is distinguishable from Crespo
considering the significant differences in the facts of both cases.
With respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, in Crespo, unlike
Schmerber, consent was at issue, and the defendant, not the police or
some other third party, performed the body surface intrusion
himself.78  There is nothing in the Schmerber decision that could
provide any guidance on the elusive issue of whether a person can
violate his or her own Fourth Amendment rights at the behest of the
State. Schmerber does dictate whether it would have been proper for
the officer to conduct the body cavity search. Specifically, finding
the search to be justified and reasonable, despite the absence of a
warrant, rested on the fact that the evidence would have been
destroyed without an immediate search.79 Such destruction was not
possible in Crespo because the defendant was handcuffed, and
therefore, he was prevented from removing the drugs from his rectal
area. 80 Additionally, there was no temporal constraint, as was
present in Schmerber, which could have justified an immediate
warrantless search. Therefore, under Schmerber, the officer-had he
conducted the cavity search-would have violated Crespo's Fourth
Amendment rights.
74 Id. (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
7 Id. at 770. The officer had reason to believe the defendant was intoxicated based on a
few telling signs: the officer smelled liquor on defendant's breath; defendant's eyes were
bloodshot; and the defendants' getting into a one car accident. Schmerber, 348 U.S. at 768.
76 Id. at 770-71 (concluding that the test was administered in a reasonable fashion given
that it was conducted in a hospital according to accepted medical practices).
n7 Id. at 77 1.
78 In Schmerber, the defendant clearly objected to the blood test. See id at 759.
7 See id at 770.
80 See Crespo, No. 10-1812, slip op., at 6.
[Vol. 27660
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An illuminating New York Court of Appeals case used by the
Crespo court in reaching its decision, People v. Gonzalez,
concerned the defendants' written consent to a search of their
apartment.82 In Gonzalez, the court found that the defendants'
consent, although in writing, was not a free and unconstrained choice,
but a product of official police coercion and pressure, and therefore,
in violation of their rights under the New York State and Federal
Constitutions.
In Gonzalez, Drug Enforcement Agent Michael Horn was
sold a " 'sample' " of cocaine by Gonzalez in the bedroom of his
small apartment in New York City.84 Horn, acting undercover as a
drug buyer, observed that Gonzalez was becoming suspicious of him
after making the initial sale, so he left and came back to the
apartment with another federal agent to make the arrest.85 With the
prospect of arrest, the defendant struggled with Horn, but was
eventually subdued after falling down a flight of stairs. 6 Moreover,
as the arrest was taking place, the defendant screamed to his newly
wedded wife to " 'lock the door.' ,81 It is also important that both
Gonzalez and his wife were under the age of twenty.88 The agents
began banging and kicking at the door of the apartment, and finally,
after an aggregate of nine federal agents were at the door, Mrs.
Gonzalez opened the door.89 She was handcuffed, and both she and
her husband were read their Miranda warnings. 90 A few minutes
later Mrs. Gonzalez's grandfather and mother came in, but after five
minutes they were forced to leave.9 ' The defense claimed that the
agents then threatened Mr. Gonzalez with prosecution under severe
state laws, rather than the more lenient federal laws, and that the
newlyweds would be separated forever. 92 The agents presented Mr.
" 347 N.E.2d 575 (N.Y. 1976).
82 Id. at 577.
" See id
84 id
" See id. 578.
86 Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 578.
8 Id.
88 Id. at 577.
89 Id. at 578.
90 See id
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Gonzalez with a consent form and asked him if he would " 'waive his
rights,' " to which he responded in the affirmative. 93 Mr. Gonzalez
signed the form and Mrs. Gonzalez signed one as well. 94  The
defendants claimed that at the time they consented to the search, they
were not sure whether Mrs. Gonzalez had flushed all of the drugs
down the toilet or if some remained in the apartment. 95 The federal
agents then conducted a full-blown "rummage search" of the
apartment and uncovered a commercial quantity of drugs.96 The
court had to decide the issue of whether the written consents were
voluntarily given, and thus, constitutionally permissible. 97
Citing to the New York and Federal Constitutions, the
Gonzalez court stated that "[g]ovemmental intrusion into the privacy
of the home is, with limited exceptions, prohibited by constitutional
limitations in the absence of a valid search warrant." 98 It noted that
the People have the "heavy burden of proving the voluntariness of the
purported consents." 99 Voluntary consent was defined to be "a true
act of the will, an unequivocal product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice."' 00 The court applied the test enumerated in
Bustamonte to determine if the consent was voluntary, which entails
an evaluation of the circumstances taken as a whole.' 0'
The court found that a very important, but not dispositive
factor, in determining the voluntariness of consent to a search, is
evaluating whether the individual was under arrest or in custody
when he authorized his consent.102 The court considered all of the
circumstances surrounding the arrest in determining consent,
including the age and experience of the defendant.'o3 The court
compiled a number of circumstances that in the collective were found
to have overcome the will of the defendant: the timing of the consent,
specifically whether it was given immediately following an arrest; the
9 Id. at 579.
94id
9 Id.
96 Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 579. A "rummage search" is not a technical legal term.
Sid.
98 Id.
" Id. at 580.
10 Id.
10 Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 580.
102 Id. at 580.
103 Id. at 581.
662 [Vol. 27
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resistance to arrest; the number of police agents present; the
handcuffing of the defendant, if at all; the defendant's experience
with police; the age of the defendant; the evasiveness of the consenter
prior to offering the consent; the assistance of the defendant in the
search; and the advisement of the defendant's right to refuse
consent.104 The court noted that none of these factors are meant to be
determinative of the issue of voluntary consent. os
The court, in applying these factors to the specific facts of the
case, found that the defendants' consent was not given voluntarily,
but was, as a matter of law, a product of unjustified police
pressure.106 The defendants, being under twenty years of age, were
particularly susceptible to police coercion, which affected their
ability to make a "free and unconstrained choice." 0 7 Additionally,
the infiltration of nine armed federal agents into a tiny apartment,
preceded by a violent physical resistance to arrest, was not at all
conducive to a voluntary consent.10 8
After concluding that the written consent could not have
possibly been voluntary, the court stated that "the facts in cases
involving constitutional limitations [should] not be clinically
dissected with the body fluids drained and the network of nerves
dead."' 09 This statement reveals the court's guiding philosophy that
drives its decisions in consent to search cases, which is to place itself
in the perspective of the consenter."o Instead of applying a
mechanistic and formal approach, the court looks at the
circumstances as a whole with a hint of compassion and realism in
making its determination."'
Another finding by the court that influenced its holding was
that the federal agents could have easily obtained a warrant instead of
exerting unjustified pressure on the defendant to consent to an
immediate search.112 The court admonished the officers' conduct in
stating it "was offensive official conduct more suitable to a police
' Id. at 580-81.
1os Id. at 580.
1o6 Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 582.
107 Id. at 581.
.os Id. at 581-582.
109 Id. at 582.
ItO Id.
1" See Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d at 582.
112 id
13
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society than to a policed society."" 3
The final holding of the court demonstrates that there may be
a slight difference in how the federal courts treat consent-based
search cases than the state courts. The court stated that "the seizure
would have hardly survived scrutiny . . . in the Federal courts," but
"may not survive scrutiny in [] State courts."ll 4 The court described
that "[a] bad seizure under the Federal Constitution in the Federal
courts is also a bad seizure under both the Federal and State
Constitutions in the courts of [New York]."" 5
The Crespo court also relied on another New York Court of
Appeals case, People v. Whitehurst,"l6 in reaching its decision.
Whitehurst dealt with the issue of whether the prosecutor or the
defendant has the burden of proving voluntary consent to a search. 17
The court held that in a consent-based search, the burden is on the
People to establish that the defendant, by consenting to a search,
voluntarily waived his or her constitutional rights."'
In Whitehurst, the defendant was approached by an officer
whom he knew from a previous narcotics arrest." 9 Upon seeing the
officer, the defendant stated, " 'Oh no. Not you again,' " to which
the detective replied, " 'Yes, it's me. What have you got this
time?' "i20 Immediately after the detective said this, the defendant
revealed from his pockets two glassine envelopes of drugs, put them
on the counter in front of the detective and said, " 'That's all I've
got.' ,121 The defendant was charged with, and plead guilty to,
unlawful possession of narcotics, and was sentenced to six months in
jail. 122
The majority of the court found that the interrogative nature
of the officer's question, " 'What have you got this time?,' " was




".6 254 N.E.2d 905 (N.Y. 1969).
117 See id at 906.
118 Id
1 Id at 905.
120 id
121 Whitehurst, 254 N.E.2d at 905-06.
122 Id. at 905.
123 Id. at 906.
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court held that because of the inquisitorial nature of the statement, the
defendant's ultimate production of the drugs in response to this
question was a waiver of his constitutional rights, thereby placing the
burden on the People to prove this waiver was voluntary. 124 The
People, along with the dissenting opinion, argued that a search never
actually occurred, and therefore, consent to a search was not an issue,
obviating the need for the People to prove the defendant made a
voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights.125 Judge Scileppi, in
dissent, logically argued that the officer never conducted a search of
the defendant because "the defendant had of his own volition, turned
the contraband over to [the detective]."l 2 6 Although the dissent
admits that a search, in order to be considered a search within the
meaning of the Constitution, does not require a "physical
examination of a person or his property," it held that "unsolicited
relinquishment of possession of contraband" cannot reasonably be a
search within the meaning of the Constitution. 127
The federal court cases cited by Crespo seem to provide scant
guidance on how the Fourth Amendment applies to cases in which
the defendant is coerced into consenting to a search involving
penetration of the person's body. A critical difference between the
facts in Bustamonte and Crespo, is that in Bustamonte, the Supreme
Court considered the consent exception to a search of a vehicle,
whereas in Crespo the defendant's body was the subject of the
search.128 A search of a person's body is the most personal and
intrusive invasions of one's privacy rights conceivable, which should
be legally permissible in only the rarest instances-when a defendant
is not only completely aware of his right to refuse, but also free and
clear from any hint of coercive bargaining.
No state or federal cases cited in Crespo provide any guidance
on the issue of whether, as in Crespo, the Fourth Amendment applies
when a defendant is coerced into searching his own person. Looking
at the text of the Fourth Amendment and the policies behind its
inception, it does not seem likely that the Fourth Amendment is
implicated under these circumstances, because no search has
124 See id.
125 See id. at 906.
126 Whitehurst, 254 N.E.2d at 907 (Scileppi J., dissenting).
127 Id at 907 (Scileppi J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
128 Compare Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 219-20, with Crespo, No. 10-1812, slip op., at 2.
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occurred.
The Crespo court, in holding that the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when he was coerced into the search
of himself, does not further the purposes of the Fourth Amendment,
but only serves to dilute it. An innocent person without drugs on his
or her person, experiencing detective Maraj's verbal inducement to
perform a self-search, would not perceive the officer's conduct as
coercive, because he or she would not have anything to be coerced
into searching for. To the innocent, threats by an officer to be
charged for every bag of crack uncovered would mean nothing. The
only possible situation in which the tactics employed by the officer in
Crespo could be deemed "coercive" is if the suspect actually had the
drugs.
The point of the Fourth Amendment is not to protect the
guilty from committing a search of themselves, but to protect the
innocent from unjustified intrusions of privacy. The Crespo court, in
holding that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated,
is saying that a person can commit an unreasonable search of
themselves. The defendant was not forced to violate himself through
the police coercion-the defendant was simply asked to retrieve
drugs from his rectal area if he had any, and if he did not, then there
would not be anything to search for.
It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a police
officer could commit an unreasonable search and seizure of a person
where that person searches himself. Only the most extreme example
fathomable could possibly amount to an unreasonable search by
oneself within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. This is where
an officer forces by coercion an innocent person to reach into himself
to prove to the officer the nonexistence of drugs. So it is only this
possibility of an innocent person being coerced to search one's
private area that the courts should fear if they were to state a general
rule that under no circumstances could a person's Fourth Amendment
rights be violated by being coerced into searching themselves. This
unintended outcome of setting such a general rule is highly unlikely
to occur, and if it does occur by the third hand of some rogue police
officer, it will surely be covered by the Fourth Amendment.
Maraj did not request an innocent person to prove to him the
nonexistence of drugs-he did not demand the defendant to search in
his rear area-he only demanded that he reveal the drugs that he
666 [Vol. 27
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believed to be present there.129 If the defendant did not have any
such drugs then he would not have searched himself, as he would
have known that there was nothing to search for. An innocent person
would not have bothered reaching into his rectal area, because
nothing would have been there.
In stating that the officer's conduct was not an invasion of the
defendant's privacy, it should not be assumed that such conduct was
proper or lawful on all grounds. The police action in question and
others resembling it "invoke societal disapproval . .. and offend our
notions of fundamental fairness." 30  Put simply, even criminals
deserve to be treated with civility. Such police coercion should not
be permitted to go unchecked, but the Fourth Amendment should not
be drafted into service for such purposes.
Assuming that the Crespo court was correct in finding that the
defendant's production of the drugs from his private area was a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, looking at
the totality of the circumstances surrounding this "search," it must be
determined whether the consent to said search was voluntary. The
standard for determining if consenting to a waiver of one's
constitutional rights is not whether the defendant would have waived
his rights absent any police action, but whether the defendant made a
"free and unconstrained choice."'31
The defendant in Crespo was handcuffed and under police
custody, which are both very important factors in considering
voluntariness. 3 2  When a person is under police custody it is
reasonable to assume the person is frightened and less able to use his
or her faculties in order to respond freely and intelligently to police
questioning. Crespo's age is unknown, and so is whether Crespo had
any prior experience with the police, which are both relevant in
determining whether he freely waived his rights. As stated in
Gonzalez, the test is subjective, requiring a look into what the
defendant was most likely experiencing and feeling during the time
he waived his rights.'33 Every detail of the events leading up to the
arrest, including the act of arresting the defendant, should be known
129 Crespo, No. 10-1812, slip op., at 2.
130 People v. Anderson, 364 N.E.2d 1318, 1319-20 (N.Y. 1977).
131 Gonzalez, 247 N.E.2d at 580.
132 Crespo, No. 10-1812, slip op., at 4.
113 See id at 582.
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in order to make an accurate determination of whether there was
voluntary consent. If the defendant had been aggressively arrested,
or treated in some way that can be viewed as an unusual departure
from an ordinary arrest, this would surely contribute to his inability to
voluntarily consent. The size and overall appearance of the arresting
officer, and as insignificant as it may seem, the depth and
commanding style of his voice, may also be relevant. The court in
making its determination seemed to focus solely on the comments
made by Detective Maraj to Crespo.
Being threatened by a detective while one is handcuffed, and
being told that the detective is going to reach into one's private area
for drugs, will most likely make anyone consent to almost anything to
avoid this humiliating and debasing act. Maraj's deplorable and
coercive conduct far exceeded what is required to prove a lack of
voluntary consent.
Bradley Shelowitz*
* Touro Law Center, J.D., 2012. Thank you to the Touro Law Review and Professor Rena
Seplowitz for guidance throughout the writing process.
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